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ABSTRACT
Personal Status laws in Egypt were first coded in 1920 and were slightly amended
throughout time. They were based on religious texts, and hence, are treated as words
and teachings of God. Thus, the amendments that were developed throughout history
were a result of different interpretations. Throughout the twentieth century, personal
status laws in Egypt were enacted by the Egyptian state to build marriage as a more
permanent bond as intended by traditional Islamic jurisprudence. Providing women
with more marital rights, including more grounds for judicial divorce, was believed
to strengthen the marital bond. This paper will trace the insight of different legal
domains and developments over time and how these laws are interpreted as Sharia
rather than Fiqh. This thesis attempts to highlight the distinction between Fiqh and
Sharia by addressing the application of Islamic Sharia in Egypt and the textual sharia
rules and teachings on personal status matters.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The status of women in Muslim societies ignites heated debates among scholars in the
fields of human rights and women’s rights. Muslim family law, in particular, is often
understood as having an antagonistic relationship to human rights and inhibiting
progress toward gender equality. Women are treated inferior to men and consistently
suppressed by law in Muslim communities in the name of Islam. Muslim societies
claim that Sharia necessitates some practices which produce inequalities and
discrimination within personal status law. Sharia refers to the system of Islam as
developed and historically understood by Muslim scholars during the first three
centuries of Islam.1
Muslims tend to believe that the legal principles and norms of Sharia derive from
religious authority. In reality, however, Muslims around the world have different
interpretations and practices on which their cultural and political realities are based.2
Adopted principles are then made legally binding by the state through their enactment
as law and enforcement by its courts. That Muslim communities approach and enforce
Sharia principles differently is apparent in the fact that a nation’s laws tend to follow
the view of a specific Islamic Jurisprudence (madhab) or a given school and exclude
the opinions of other schools or jurists.3 Egypt, for example, under the direction of alAzhar, draws its interpretations from the Hanafi madhab. Al-Azhar is the oldest and
most renowned institution in Islamic law. The Fatimid Caliphate founded the
institution in 970 CE as a center of Islamic teaching. Al-Azhar now serves as an
institution from which the courts and legislators seek fatwas (Islamic opinions).4

1 Baderin, M. (2009). Understanding Islamic law in theory and practice. Legal
Information Management, 9(3), 186-190.
2 Id. at 190.
3 Jackson, S. A. (1996). Islamic law and the state: the constitutional
jurisprudence of Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfī (Vol. 1). Brill. 108
4 Timothy, M. (1988). Colonising Egypt. Berkely-Los Angeles-Oxford. 84-85
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This thesis argues that personal status law necessarily evolves based on fiqh rather
than Sharia. While Sharia is often characterized as a concrete set of principles,
personal status law actually derives a broad range of applications and interpretations
of Sharia from the madhabs. Acknowledging the human-derived basis of the law and
its ever-evolving nature provides opportunities to contextualize Sharia interpretations
in different social spheres while still honoring its principles. Doing so ultimately
allows Muslim communities to respond to and cope with their changing social needs.
This thesis begins by highlighting the distinction between Fiqh and Sharia by
addressing the application of Islamic Sharia in Egypt and the textual sharia rules and
teachings on personal status matters. Examining the theoretical framework of
Egyptian personal status laws reveals a distinction between Egyptian Islamic
jurisprudence and the divine texts. Egyptian personal status law has never been
codified in a comprehensive code, making it inaccessible and difficult to understand.5
In addition, while Sharia dictates personal status law, family court judges are also
trained at secular law schools. Thus, there are consequences of turning fiqh into state
law that judges are expected to apply without an appropriate background in
Islamic fiqh.
In most cases, courts turn to Mufti al-Azhar, the foremost jurist at al-Azhar, for a
decision.6 Therefore, distinguishing between Egyptian Islamic jurisprudence and the
divine texts matters because Egypt’s personal status codes are vague enough to leave
room for interpretation. Judges who are not trained in fiqh legitimize their decisions
by drawing on sources such as statutory family codes, religious sources, customary
norms, and court precedents.
Next, this thesis explores the historical development of Egyptian personal status law.
Understanding the nature and development of Sharia is vital to addressing current
issues in Muslim personal status law. Reading the principles of Sharia, drawn from

5 Najjar, F. M. (1988). Egypt's Laws of Personal Status. Arab Studies Quarterly,
319, 323-25
6 Haddad, Y. Y., & Esposito, J. L. (Eds.). (1997). Islam, gender, and social
change. Oxford University Press.
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edicts in the Quran and Sunnah, and the historical development of Egyptian personal
status law together makes clear that family law is not static. Instead, it evolves. This is
explained herein by the history and evolution of Sharia and its confinement in law
throughout history across Islamic countries.
Furthermore, the history of personal status law shows that limiting it to Sharia is a
very recent phenomenon that emerged during the colonial period of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Nevertheless, given the confinement of
Sharia to personal status law after independence in the majority of Islamic countries,
the relationship between the broad framework of Sharia and the limited principles of
personal status law becomes problematic.
There are also risks of stagnation and distortion in upholding the normative authority
of Muslim personal status law, which is based on a traditional pre-modern system.
Early traditions have grown unfit for policymaking and should not be applied within
the radically different legal frameworks of modern nation-states. For instance, a
particular Sharia view of maintenance (nafaqa) for a divorced woman or a person
entitled to custody of children is part of a broader system of social and legal relations.
But the social and legal relations the view was developed under, are those of the
jurists who first understood them expressed that legal opinion. They are now
outdated. Applying that same opinion in contexts with vastly different social and legal
relationships is counterproductive, not only from the perspective of today’s societies
but also from that of Sharia’s founding scholars. The problem is compounded when
there is no possibility of reviewing or reformulating jurisprudence despite substantial
changes in social and legal relations. However, there is no possibility for coherent
review and reformulation of such principles without exploring the origins of Sharia in
historical context.
This thesis argues that these issues can only be addressed by changing the nature and
content of Muslim personal status laws in Islamic countries. This change is already
happening as personal status laws in most Islamic countries today are enacted in
statutory form by the state rather than derived directly from traditional sources of
Sharia. Also, whether a judgment is based on a selection by a judge or a statute, it is
enforceable and legally binding only by the state’s authority. These modern Sharia-

3

based laws derive power from the state rather than religious responsibility. This
source of their authority represents a stark deviation from the past.
This thesis holds that it is best to recognize that this field, like other fields of law,
derives its authority from the state’s political will. When Sharia-derived laws are
recognized as laws enforced by the state rather than divine authority, it is easier to
reform the law to adapt to modern situations. Rather than claiming that the legal
authority of personal status law rests on Sharia, the state should acknowledge it as a
living, developing system. Acknowledging this would allow for more innovative
approaches to personal status law reform. Such reforms may still be guided by Islamic
principles derived from fiqh and ijtihad without being confined to traditional
understandings of Sharia.
Egypt was one of the first countries to adopt the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and ratify it in 1981.7 However,
Egypt’s representative to CEDAW stated that Islamic law “had already liberated
(women) from any form of discrimination.”8 Thus, Egypt entered reservations
concerning several articles such as Article 2, articulating the commitment to eradicate
discrimination; Article 9, delineating equal citizenship rights; and Article 16,
containing provisions for eradicating discrimination in marriage and the family.9
Egypt expressed its concern with Article 16, stating that a reservation is necessary to
comply with Sharia. It claimed that the provision’s obligations “must be without
prejudice to the Islamic Sharia provisions”.10
This thesis also argues that acknowledging the human-derived nature of the law and
the need for a more innovative approach would resolve many of the critical issues in
personal status law concerned with marriage, divorce, and custody. Accepting the

7 Brandt, M., & Kaplan, J. A. (1995). The Tension between Women’s Rights and
Religious Rights: Reservations to Cedaw by Egypt, Bangladesh and Tunisia. Journal of
Law and Religion, 12(1), 105–142. https://doi.org/10.2307/1051612
8 Id. at 118
9 Id.
10 Id.
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inevitable role of human choice and interpretation in the formation of Muslim
personal status law does not dictate the approach to the Quran or Sunnah of the
Prophet on marriage, divorce, custody, and so forth. These ideas would enable the
foundation of a new personal status law system that is based on sound social policy
for present Islamic societies. It would allow for adaptable and relevant understandings
of the Qur’an and Sunna. Therefore, I suggest that human agency relates to the
reflection on policy rationale and the meaning of those texts in the context of seventhcentury Arabia, instead of its literal application in all social settings forever.11 While it
is common to presume that Islamic law is divine, that position is, rather, a
misunderstanding of the nature and importance of human agency in the creation of
Islamic law.12
Still today, human agency should decide how to interpret those texts as social policy
and articulate a purpose in the modern context. The application of Sharia as an
immutable, comprehensive normative system represents a misunderstanding. Sharia
was not applied this way in the pre-colonial period. Human agency played a crucial
role in the interpretation of the Quran and Sunna. This is evident because these divine
sources can be interpreted and applied only in the specific context of time and place.
The importance of human agency is also evident in the diversity of opinion among
Muslim scholars and various schools of Islamic Jurisprudence. Muslims throughout
time have benefitted from a diversity of opinion and competing views that are seen as
equally valid from Sharia. This is further demonstrated by an overview of the
application of Sharia throughout history.

11 KHALED ABOU EL FADL, The Great Theft, Wrestling Islam From The Extremists,
30 (first edition, New York, NY, Harper San Francisco 2005) (2005).
12 Id. at 31
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II.

UNPACKING KEY CONCEPTS

A. How Islam Changed Personal Status in Arabia
In pre-Islamic Arabia, the most common marriage contracts resembled a sale where
the woman was, essentially, her husband’s property.13 The wife’s tribe would receive
payment of her dowry upon their marriage. The wife would follow the husband to his
tribe and bear his children, considered “his blood.”14 There was a strong emphasis on
the fidelity and chastity of the woman, so her family would limit her freedom to
ensure her reputation and the family’s honor. Women were excluded from inheriting
any wealth or land, as it would be transferred to another tribe. Thus, women were
entirely dependent on their husbands for maintenance and support and were subject to
her status as a married woman, subject to her husband’s kindred. Men completely
subjugated women. Before marriage, women’s fathers, brothers, and close relatives
remained in control of much of their lives. Then, after marriage, power was
transferred to their husbands.15 Women had no voice in initiating or terminating their
marriage. Men’s right to marry limitlessly also contributed to the inferior status of
women.16
The Quran came to change the social foundation from blood kinship and tribal loyalty
to the basic unity of the extended family. It came to recognize that women were part
of a strong family; this recognition can be seen in reforms in marriage, divorce, and
inheritance of family law.17 The Quran intended to raise women’s status and achieve a
measure of equality. The Quran specified requirements for a marriage contract; for the

13 Esposito, J. L. (2001). Women in Muslim family law. Syracuse University Press. See
also, Shaham, R. (1997). Family and the Courts in Modern Egypt: A Study Based on
Decisions by the Sharīʻa Courts, 1900-1955 (Vol. 3). Brill, 14.
14 Esposito, J. L. (1975). Women's Rights in Islam. Islamic Studies, 14(2), 99-114.
15 Id. at 114
16 Id. See also, Family and the Courts in Modern Egypt: A Study Based on Decisions
by the Sharīʻa Courts, 1900-1955 (Vol. 3). Brill, 14.
17 Supra note at 114
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agreement to be in written form despite the custom of oral contracts, for at least two
witnesses to be present at the time of the contract, etc.18
The verses of the Quran gradually replaced and revised tribal customs in Medina with
new rules.19 Some of the most fundamental reforms made by the Quran to customary
law are to strengthen the family and improve the status of women.20
“In the realm of marriage, for example, the Quran commands that only the wife and
not her father or other male relatives should receive the dower (mahr) from her
husband: “And give the women [on marriage] their dower as a free gift” (IV:4). Thus,
the woman becomes a legal partner to the marriage contract rather than an object for
sale. In addition, unlimited polygamy was curtailed, and the number of wives limited
to four. However, a final injunction stressed that if the husband did not believe that he
could be equally fair to each of his wives, he should marry only one: “Marry women
of your choice, two, three or four. But if ye fear that ye shall not be able to deal justly
[with them] then only one” (IV:3).
In another place, the Quran continues: “Ye are never able to be fair and just as
between women, even if that were your ardent desire” (IV:129).21
When read holistically then, the Quran prohibits polygamy. Divorce and inheritance
were also examples of Quranic reforms of existing practice. Divorce reforms included
creating the iddah (waiting period) of three months for an opportunity for
reconciliation or until delivery before a husband can divorce his wife if she was

18 Masud, M. K., B. Messick and D.S. Powers (1996) Muftis, fatwas, and Islamic legal
interpretation Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 3r 3a
19 Ḥammūdah ʻAbd al-ʻAṭī. (1970). The family structure in Islam (Doctoral dissertation,
éditeur
nonidentifié).https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/a20d/66d75003ce38825bd31aa9da85b980
27f26f.pdf.
20 Id.
21

Id.
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pregnant. Inheritance also came to be amended by the Quran to include women in
inheritance as they were excluded under the agnatic system that preceded Islam.22
B. What is Sharia?
The term Sharia refers to the divine sources of Islamic law, specifically the Qur’an
and the Sunnah of Prophet Muhammad.23 Fiqh, on the other hand, is the human
jurisprudential aspect of Islamic law.24 It refers to the understanding of Sharia by
Muslim jurists. Therefore, it is not immutable. It is distinguished from the legal
rulings of Sharia that are considered divine and immutable. Fiqh, as we can recognize
by examining the history of Islamic law and its implementation in the next section of
this thesis, is not divine and changes according to time and circumstance.25 It is
crucial to stress the distinction and the epistemological implications because fiqh is
incorrectly equated with Sharia.26 Therefore, the immutability of law derived from
Sharia, which some Islamists claim, does not apply to fiqh, a juristic interpretation of
Sharia. Consequently, we must distinguish between fiqh and Sharia sources and rules.
Fiqh texts, which are primarily patriarchal and are enforced as divine texts to invoke
legal practices, result from the status of personal status law in the legal scene today.27
Because of the literal interpretations and the restrictive understanding of the religious
text in Islam, women have become victims of the abandoned flexibility and leniency
of Sharia as an emancipatory force in family law.28

22 Supra note at 13. See also, Shaham, R. (1997). Family and the Courts in Modern
Egypt: A Study Based on Decisions by the Sharīʻa Courts, 1900-1955 (Vol. 3). Brill, 14.
23 Supra note 1 at 187
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Mir-Hosseini, Z. (2009). Towards gender equality: Muslim family laws and the
Shari’ah. Wanted: equality in the Muslim family, 23-64.
27 Mashhour, A. (2005). Islamic Law and Gender Equality-Could There Be a Common
Ground: A Study of Divorce and Polygamy in Sharia Law and Contemporary Legislation
in Tunisia and Egypt. Hum. Rts. Q. 564
28 Supra note 26 at 23-64.
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Fiqh was established by the four schools of thought during the Taqlid period.29 During
this period, all the legal opinions and Fatwas were issued by jurists. Therefore,
historians and scholars presumed Islamic law formulated during this period to be
derived from the Quran, Sunnah, ijmaa, and qiyas rather than regarding fiqh in the
understanding of the sources of Sharia.30 This presumption enabled jurists and
scholars to codify Sharia law as part of the centralization process. This codification
may be considered logical because it ensures the stability and transparency of the
legal system. However, the (nominal) codification of the Sharia actually resulted in
the mummification of Islamic law. This codification not only compromised the
flexibility that Sharia law ensured; it also closed the gate for any potential
interpretation of Sharia that would be consistent with modern times.
C. What are the basic sources of Sharia?
Sharia is based on two primary sources: the Quran and the Sunnah.31 The Quran is the
principal source of Sharia and is supplemented by the Sunnah.32 However, the
prescriptions of the Quran and the Sunnah require interpretation. Many of the Hadith
of the Prophet (part of the Sunnah) interpret some of the verses of the Quran.
Therefore, after the death of the Prophet in 632 CE, the need for a continuing process
of interpretation became more critical.33 This resulted in the development of ijma
(consensus) and qiyas (analogy) as two secondary sources in case the primary sources
did not have answers for any given question or appeared to be ambiguous or
inconsistent.34

29 Shalakany, A. A. (2008). Islamic legal histories. Berkeley J. Middle E. & Islamic L.,
1, 1. 13
30 Id. at 13
31 Alarefi, A. S. (2009). Overview of Islamic law. International Criminal Law Review,
9(4), 708
32 Id. at 708
33 Id. at 709
34 Alarefi, A. S. (2009). Overview of Islamic law. International Criminal Law Review,
9(4), 709
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Quran is the primary source of Sharia. It is the divine word of God that was revealed
to Muhammad by the Angel Gabriel in its precise meaning and wording to verify that
Muhammad is God’s Messenger.35 The Quran was revealed over a period of 22 years,
ending with Prophet Muhammad’s death in 632 CE.36 The Prophet was accustomed to
reading the Quran to his companions after its revelation, who would compete in
reciting the Holy Quran as a book of spiritual guidance.37 The legal verses of the
Quran include 70 verses on family and inheritance, 60 verses on obligation and
contracts, 30 verses on criminal law, and 20 verses on legal procedure.38 Qur’anic
rules are classified to include: rules relevant to the Islamic faith, such as the belief in
God, his Angels, the revealed Book, the Day of Judgement and Fate; ethical rules
such as rules on the virtues every Muslim should have and deeds they should abstain
from; and practical rules such as general behavior.39
Additionally, Quranic jurisprudence includes rules for worship, dictating daily
prayers, fasting, pilgrimage, and Islamic rituals and forms of worship in general, as
well as rules dictating everyday life such as business contracts and the relationship
between Muslims and everyday dealings.40 However, the Quran does not offer details
explaining the rules and jurisprudence. For example, there is no mention of the sum of
money in which charity is payable or the details of worship.41 There are also no
details dictating anything. The philosophy constructing Quranic legislation is that
general, flexible principles are arranged to accommodate the needs of people at all
times and in all places, allowing the variety of interests of nations as they develop and

35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 711
40 Id. at 711
41 Id.
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time as it passes.42 The Holy Quran goes into detail on only rare occasions. However,
the Prophet himself supplied details during his life.43
The Sunnah is the second leading source of legislative rules after the Quran. The
Sunnah consists of all the sayings, deeds, or settlements issued by The Prophet. It also
includes all the deeds and practices he approved.44 The Sunnah details the obligation
to pay charity (Zakat) and perform prayer and pilgrimage. To maintain Sunnah’s
accuracy, scholars developed a system to recognize different categories of Hadith
(Prophet’s Sayings and teachings). The basic idea for understanding how to evaluate
the text of Hadith is to establish whether it is correct, good, weak, or false.45
The third source of Sharia is ijma (consensus of opinion). Ijmaa is defined as the
unanimous agreement among Muslim scholars during the period after the Prophet’s
death on legal judgments on a particular incident.46 If a judgment cannot be reached
through the Quranic texts or the Sunnah of the Prophet, Muslim scholars interfere
using the general rulings of Islam based on ijmaa or qiyas.47 The process
of ijmaa happens through consultation (shura), which is legislated in Islam.48 There
are four principles for ijmaa to be reached: First, there should be several scholars at
the time of the incident to ensure varied opinions. Second, all Muslim scholars have
to unanimously agree on the judgment of the incident, irrespective of their nationality,
race, or school of thought. Third, the Mujahidin (those knowledgeable in Islamic law
and Sunnah) should express their points of view clearly and openly.
Fourth, ijmaa should be formulated only if the viewpoints are unanimously agreed
upon.49

42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 712
45 Id. at 713
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 714
49 Id. at 715
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Finally, qiyas is the fourth primary source of Sharia; qiyas refers to settling between
two things. It is used to establish a decision, rule, or judgment due to a specific case
using the rule or judgment of another particular case.50 Qiyas has four elements. The
first is using the original (asl) as a standard. Second, the branch (far’) is the similar or
resembling case refers to the occurrence for which a rule is sought. Third, the cause
(‘illah) intends to provide a link between the origin and the branch. Fourth, the rule or
principle of the origin, which the Quran, Sunnah, or ijmaa prove.51
D. The Islamic Schools of Thought
The major schools of Islamic thought (mudhahib, sing. madhab) emerged relatively
late. The timing of their emergence shows how the Sharia we know today continued
to evolve until relatively recently, as did the authoritative collection of Sunna and the
development of its methodology (fiqh). The main surviving schools of Islamic
jurisprudence emerged after the death of the Prophet (after 632 CE).52 However, later
developments and the evolution of these schools were influenced by demographic,
political, and social factors. These factors led to their becoming more regionally
specific. This was the case for the Shia school, and it also led to the extinction of
some schools such as the al-Tabari School in the Sunni tradition.53
Two of the four major Sunni schools still in use today were the first to be developed
and became the most geographically widespread: the Hanafi and Maliki schools. The
Hanafi School was the first school of jurisprudence.54 It was founded by Imam Abu
Hanifah Numan Bin Thabit, born in Iraq in 699 BE. Abu Hanifah Numan was a great
non-Arab scholar who was famous for his intelligence. He belonged to a period of
successors of the Prophet’s companions.55 He developed a new approach known as
‘ra’y’ or subjective decision-making that primarily depended on Qur’an and the
50 Id. at 716
51 Id.
52 Nasir, J. J. (Ed.). (1990). The Islamic law of personal status. Brill Archive. 12-13
53 Id.
54 Supra note 34 at 718
55 Id.
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Sunnah.56 His approach was investigated using ijma and qiyas. It also followed
traditions and reason. While several legal doctrines and works have been ascribed to
him, Abu Hanifah himself never wrote any systematic work of jurisprudence or
created a formal code.57 Instead, his pupils transmitted his works on Jurisprudence. It
enjoyed the support of the Abbasid Dynasty in its origin point, Iraq, and elsewhere in
the Middle East, Northeast Africa, and Western Asia. For the Abbasids, it was a
center of state power. From its origin in Iraq, it also spread to Afghanistan and later to
the Indian subcontinent. Indian Muslims later brought it to East Africa. The ruling
authority remained an essential characteristic of the Hanafi school until the Ottoman
Empire, and Hanafi law is still predominant in Iraq, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Sudan,
Egypt, Palestine, and India.58
The Maliki School, meanwhile, emerged in the city of Medina on the Arabian
Peninsula. It was founded by Imam Malik bin Anas, born 713 CE.59 Imam Malik was
a great scholar of Hadiths and Sunnah.60 He constructed a code of law titled alMuwata based on the legal practices of Medina. Al-Muwata covers several areas of
Islam, ranging from rituals of prayer and fasting to the proper conduct of business
relations.61 While the legal code is supported by 2,000 traditions attributed to the
Prophet, it has been criticized by scholars who question the authenticity of the Hadith.
Those critical of the code claim that the work was an interpretation of Imam Malik's
personal legal reasoning.62 The Maliki school differs from the other madhabs in the

56 Id.
57 Id. at 719
58 Weiss,B. G and Green, A. H. (1987) A survey of Arab History, revised ed., Cairo:
American .
University Of Cairo Press. 155. See also, Melchert C. - (1999) 'How Hanfaism came to
originate in Kufa and traditionalism in Medina, Islamic . Law and Society 6,3:318-47. It
is worth noting that alongside the Hanafi School, the Shia Jafari School is common in
Iraq and Turkey, while the Shafiite School still enjoys some prominence in Palestine.
59 Supra note 34 at 719
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
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sources from which it derives its rulings. The other three schools of thought derive
their sources first from the Quran, then from the Sunnah, ijma, and qiyas. In contrast,
the Maliki School uses the practice of the people of Medina as its source.63 From its
origin in Medina, the Maliki school of thought spread across northern Africa to Libya,
Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco, and farther south to Eritrea, Sudan, Nigeria, Gambia,
Senegal, and Ghana. It also grew popular in other territories of the Arabian Peninsula,
including Kuwait.64
A third school, the Shafiite, originated in Cairo. Its founder, Muhammad ibn Idris AlShafiʽi, was born in Palestine in 767 CE.65 He migrated and lived in Cairo during the
early years of his life and was a student of Malik Bin Anas. He became an expert on
the Hanafi and Maliki schools.66 Al-Shafi‘i was influenced by both Abu Hanifah and
Malik Bin Anas’ teachings before he founded his own school. He enclosed his
writings and fatwas that came to be known as “The Old” (al-Qadim) and “The New”
(al-Jadid). These volumes correspond to his stays in Iraq and Egypt.67 He also
authored many books, including al-Risalah fi Usul al-Fiqh, which greatly influenced
Islamic fiqh. Because of the popularity of his work, al-Shafi‘i was eventually called
the father of Islamic Jurisprudence.68 The Shafiite school spread outward from Cairo
with the Jafari school to Yemen and along the Indian coastline. It also spread to parts
of East Africa and Southeast Asia via Arab trade routes. Today, the Shafiite school
remains predominant in Sri Lanka, Indonesia, the Maldives, Singapore, and
Malaysia.69
The fourth and final major school of thought, the Hanbali, was founded by Imam
Ahmed Bin Hanbal, born 780 CE in Baghdad. He was the student of Imam As-Shafi‘i
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and he directed his efforts towards studying the Sunnah. Imam Ahmed Bin Hanbal
was considered to be more of a traditionalist than a jurist as his works resemble a
collection of tradition rather than legal opinion.70 He created al-Musnad, a collection
of 30,000 traditions. He based his teachings on the Quran and Sunnah. He accepted
ijma and qiyas only where necessity dictated it.71 The Hanbali school has always been
the least popular. It came close to extinction before it was revived by Ibn Abdel
Wahab’s puritanical movement in Arabia during the late eighteenth century. It
remains confined to the region until today.72
The dynamics and timing of the emergence of each school influenced their views on
Sharia. The Hanafi and Malaki madhabs emphasized pre-existing practices.
Meanwhile, the Shafiite and the Hanbali schools drew on their views of the theories
of Sharia. Differences emerged through the schools of thought’s intellectual contexts
and the period in which each school emerged, developed, and was influenced by the
politics and rulers of the time. The schools also influenced each other and were
shaped by social and economic experiences of their times.73 While the schools
depended on the text of Quran and Sunnah for the source of its knowledge, they
differed in their use of ijma (consensus) and qiyas (analogy) in resolving legal
disputes.74 It is worth noting that there remain great differences among the four major
schools of thought and the way that societies interpret or apply them today.75
However, there are no differing opinions among the four schools of thought regarding
the basic principles of Islam..76
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Consensus (ijmaa) is a principle that acted as a factor, reflecting the central content of
all Sunni schools through the principle of independent reasoning (ijtihad). The
principle that the consensus of all schools of thought must conform to create an
authoritative law means that, if there is more than one opinion on a specific issue, all
schools must be accepted as legitimate to produce a rule (hukm).77 While this
principle reflects the flexibility and adaptability of the rules of Sharia, a strong
emphasis on consensus resulted in a negative consequence: the notion that the
possibility of ijtihad no longer exists by the tenth century as Sharia was believed to
have been fully elaborated by the time. The decline and breakdown of Islamic
societies’ political and social institutions during this time was probably also an
explanation for the necessity of this rigidity.78
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III.

TRUE SHARIA IS NOT IMMUTABLE

Analyzing Sharia’s True Principles
There have been more recent developments and adaptations of Sharia through legal
opinions (fatwas) throughout time. However, judicial developments occurred within
an already established framework. So, while judicial developments worked around
newly issued fatwas, there has not been any real change to Sharia’s basic structure.
Sharia has remained “immutable” over many decades, and its content has continued to
reflect the political, economic, and social conditions of the eighth to tenth centuries.79
Thus, adaptions of Sharia grew more and more detached from modern realities and
societal and state developments. 80
Whereas Islamic law had been applied throughout history via fiqh, based on
human reasoning and interpretations of Islamic texts, the need for a rule-based legal
system led to Sharia’s rigidification. This rigidification meant that Sharia lost its
essence as a lenient and flexible method of solving disputes. Societies’ dual
commitment to embracing some form of Sharia, particularly in private matters, and
creating a coherent legal system, created an immutable form of Muslim personal
status law. This compromise, however, produced a distortion in the true principles of
Sharia.
The historical background of the development of Sharia shows that modern
interpretations of Sharia as immutable, comprehensive, and normative are a distortion
of its true principles. Sharia has traditionally been much more lenient and flexible.
Today’s understanding of Sharia as immutable limits is potential for further reform.
This preliminary analysis raises several further questions concerning the
legitimacy and meaning of Sharia and its application in today’s system: Has Sharia
been excised from its founding principles, stripped of its ability to evolve, and
imprisoned within a stagnant Egyptian legal system? How do religious believers
reconcile their belief in the inviolability and unity of religious legal matters with the
practices of the state legal system? Within this system, legislation is done via
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statutory enactment, and the law is applied in courts. These questions are explored
further in this section, taking Egypt as a case study.
Even though the term Islamic law is mainly used to refer to the legal aspects
of Sharia, it is also essential to note that Muslims tend to perceive that the legal
quality of those norms and principles is based on their assumed religious authority.81
However, Sharia principles are legally binding via the state and state actors, who
enforce and implement them. Accordingly, Muslim personal status laws governing
family relations, marriage, and divorce, based on Sharia, are known as Shariat al
ahwal al-shakhseya, literally personal status laws, in Arabic. Confining Sharia to
family law matters is a very recent phenomenon that emerged during the colonial
period of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Maintaining the normative authority of Islamic family law based on a premodern system unfamiliar to policymakers, legal professionals, and the general public
is problematic and brings risks of distortion and stagnation.82 Applying Islamic
Family Law within a radically different legal and constitutional framework of the
modern nation-state can be counterproductive.83
As previously noted, many schools of Islamic jurisprudence developed after
Prophet Muhammad’s death. General principles also began to emerge during the first
century of Islam through the practices of community governors, judges, and leaders.84
The views of leading scholars also shaped general principles.85 As noted earlier, the
timing of the emergence of each school has influenced the content and orientation of
their views on Sharia.86 Gradually, all possibilities of Ijtihad slowed down by the
tenth century because Sharia had been exhaustively interpreted elaborated. Sharia's
developments and adaptations through fatwas and judicial developments occurred
within an already established broader methodology and principles. Specialists
continue to question the scope of belief in the immutability of family law over the last
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thousand years and refine our knowledge of how the system worked at different
stages of history.87
However, the core content of the existing “Sharia,” or, to be more accurate,
Muslim family law in practice, continues to reflect the social, political, and economic
conditions of the eighth to tenth centuries. Hence, the legal system continues to grow
away from the developments and realities of our state and society. Muslim family
law became the symbol of Islamic identity. The state played an essential role in
mediating the relevance of Sharia as a broader legal and political system of
government and social organization in order to maintain the historical religious
identity of Muslims through the application of Sharia.
Islamic societies underwent a significant transformation, as European model
nation-states were created from Islamic societies as part of a global system. These
changes radically transformed the political, economic, and social relations in the
region. The Europeanization process in Egypt excluded family laws as those opposed
to Europeanization and secularization saw family laws as the last straw of the Islamic
legal system and chose to preserve Islam in the face of western-inspired secularism
and feminism.88
Modern legal transformations began in the mid-nineteenth century as
explained before. These transformations affected Islamic rules on the family, which
had been articulated and developed during the pre-modern era. Such rules had grown
outdated because Sharia was believed to have reached its peak of development during
a much earlier period. As such, there was no possibility for further development.
Codified principles of Sharia constituted the contemporary doctrine on the family in
Egypt and the rest of the Arab world.89
Before these rules were developed, the Taqlid legal system prevailed in Egypt
to necessitate the structural arrangement within the family to position the husband to
provide for “maintenance.” In contrast, the wife provides conjugal loyalty in return.
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During the secularization process, the Taqlid system was left to regulate only the
family laws. The Taqlid was developed during the early Islamic societies in the 2nd
century of the Islamic calendar (hijri)90 and was deemed invalid by Muslim practice.91
Technically the meaning of taqlid is to follow the opinion or word of another
without proof. In plain terms, it means to follow the opinion of a jurist without
knowing the authority of their opinion, or questioning the basis of his opinion in
Quran, Sunna and Ijma (consensus).92 Taqlid was used to describe the legal system
that prevailed in the Islamic world for nine hundred years, from the tenth to the
nineteenth century.93 During this period, Muslim scholars and jurists seemed to
abandon the religious and legal project of ijtihad, the process in which Muslim jurists
and scholars come up with new rules and reasonings inspired by the sources of
religion.94 Muslims and scholars tended to conform with the doctrine of one’s school
instead of attempting to read the word of God to reconstruct new rules.95 During the
era of Taqlid, schools of law treated the doctrines of various schools as the law of the
land, displacing and overshadowing the Quran and Sunnah as the sources of the law.96
Muftis, judges and jurists hardly attempted to rationalize the doctrine of their schools
of thought to easily implement a centralized legal system.97 Rather, they scattered the
doctrines of their schools in several literature including treatises or commentaries to
books as fatwa.98
Most of the legal rules comprising family legislation in Egypt were adopted
from pre-modern Islamic legal systems such as Taqlid.99 The laws and rules of Taqlid
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that were amended during and after the Europeanization process trace back to the
historic Taqlid origins in the 10th century, which gradually stripped the husband of his
excess power within the family. In the years 1985, these reforms managed to limit the
husband’s power in marriage and restrict the interpretation of the wife’s duty to obey
the husband, expanding her grounds to request a divorce.100. Reforms, such as the
Law 100 of 1985, are described as an attempt of Egyptian secular male elites to strike
a compromise and mediate the demands of contemporary feminists and religious
intelligentsia.101 In other words, it was an attempt to modernize personal status law
while maintaining the law’s Islamic character. For example, Egyptian lawmakers
attempted reform by following discrete steps and actions; they increased women’s
maintenance rights by including medical expenses as part of the items constituting her
maintenance package, which is not consistent with the Hanafi school of thought.102
They also reduced women’s obligation to obey her husband such as being considered
disobedient if she leaves her house for work without her husband’s permission, which
is also inconsistent with Hanafi doctrine. 103 Egyptian feminists also fought to end
humiliating practices of using the police to enforce obedience as a legal duty.104
Legislators also granted women the power to request divorce for harm (Law
25 of 1929), and allowed women to be granted a divorce even if they fail to prove
harm (Law 100 of 1985).105 Between the years 1929 and 1985, Law No 77 of 1943 on
Inheritance, Law No 71 of 1946 on Testamentary Bequests, and Law No 62 of 1976
concerning maintenance were issued.106 Law No. 62 of 1976 established a system in
which women who couldn’t get their maintenance rights from court rulings could get
financial support from the Nasser Social Bank. The fund was collected from ex-
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husbands and fathers.107 This system could not work because the bank faced issues
collecting funds from debtors. Law No 1 of 2000 and Law No 11 of 2004 stipulated
that those funds will be apaid by administrative fees of registration of marriages,
divorces, and births as well as allocations from the Finance Ministry and private
donations.108 It also stipulated that if the debtor is a government employee, 50 percent
of his salary is automatically deducted to pay for the alimony.109 If he is an employee
or a business owner in the private sector, he is required to deposit the maintenance
amount in the bank at the beginning of each month.110
After obtaining their independence from colonial rule, Muslim societies chose
to be bound by national and international obligations of membership in a community
of nation-states.111 Despite the apparent differences in the social development and
political stability levels that Islamic societies attain, they all live under constitutional
regimes that require respect for minimum rights of non-discrimination and equality.
Even if legal systems and national constitutions fail to acknowledge or provide these
obligations in Egypt, a minimum degree of compliance is ensured by legal, political,
economic, and other means of international relations. One example of this is their
obligations to the CEDAW agreement, which Egypt ratified with reservations.112
These reservations are one of the main reasons the legal system continues to apply
Islamic law to personal status law.
This section has shown that Sharia was never free from state supervision, nor
did it ever have an exclusive jurisdiction throughout history. The actual practice of
Muslim states and societies does not support the concept of immutable principles of
Shariah. The system’s modern rigidity departs from the flexibility with which Sharia
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was initially intended to be applied. Muslim practice in pre-colonial eras allowed
parties to seek an Islamic opinion from jurists within their madhab and accept their
ruling. Muslims have always sought fatwas to address their religious needs, including
laws governing family matters. At the same time, however, modern legal systems
understandably attempt to codify and unite the principles of Sharia for an easier and
more consistent application.113
Thus, the dilemma remains whether personal status law can remain governed
by Sharia, when the remaining legal system is governed by secular law. Why does
family law remain unchanged, governed by Sharia? Does this mean that personal
status law is “divine” law? The most common answer to these questions is that family
law is explicit in detail in the Quran and Sunna, unlike other realms of law.
Inheritance law and other areas of family law remain the most developed in Sharia.
Thus, it is more pragmatic to reform every other aspect of law. Another answer is that
governments tend to distinguish between the public and the private sphere, making
the private sphere less politically significant and leaving it in the hands of religion.
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IV.

THE PROBLEM OF PERSONAL STATUS LAW IN EGYPT

A. Overview of Personal Status Law in Egypt
Personal Status Law in Egypt reflects a conservative patriarchal model of Islamic
society that restricts women’s rights found in the Quran and Sunna. Islamic Sharia
governed all aspects of law in Egypt until the 19th century. By the end of the 19th
century, the legal system had been secularized in all aspects of life except the family
sphere.114 Egypt’s secular commercial, criminal, and civil codes were adopted based
on the French code. The only branch of law that remained unchanged was Personal
Status Law, in which Hanafi jurisprudence was strictly applied. Family law remained
unreformed until the Egyptian Laws of Personal Status of 1920 and 1929. The
requirement of official documentation of marriage was established in the early 1900s.
In 1923, marriage registrars were required to ensure that the bride and groom were of
the legal age to conclude their marriage. In 1931, the Law of the Organization and
Procedure of Sharia Courts prohibited courts from hearing marriage disputes where
the bride and groom had not reached the legal age.
Regarding divorce, the first changes during the Ottoman Empire in 1915 came to
grant women the right to divorce her husband if he deserts her or is diagnosed with a
contagious disease that endangers her.115 Later, other grounds for divorce were
established by Law No. 25 of 1920 and Law No. 25 of 1929. New grounds for a
woman to seek divorce in these laws included the husband’s failure to provide
maintenance, husband’s dangerous or contagious disease, desertion, or
maltreatment.116
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In Law No. 25 of 1920, women were also granted and ensured the right to
maintenance. Expressly, Article 1 of Law No. 25 of 1920 stipulated that maintenance
was a debt owed by the husband, which should be calculated from the divorce date.117
Articles 4 and 5 ensured that maintenance could be extracted from the husband’s
property. Article 5 also stipulated that a wife could be granted an immediate divorce if
the husband failed to provide maintenance due to his financial means or absence or if
his location was unknown. However, the divorce could be revoked if the husband
proved his goodwill by paying the current maintenance. Article 3 of Law No. 25 of
1920 stipulated that the husband may stop paying maintenance after two years or until
the woman would stop having menses for an entire year.118 The law maintained that if
the wife does not have custody of the children, she is entitled to at least two years of
maintenance if she was divorced against her will.119 These laws aimed to fix the
maximum iddah possible, set at three years, without nursing.
In 1929, the issue was amended again to set minimum and maximum periods
for iddah. The maximum period was set at one year from the divorce date. Article 7
of Law No. 25 of 1929 addressed the issue of custody of the children. It stipulated
that boys would stay with their mothers until the age of nine and girls until the age of
eleven, then the custody would be passed to the father. The potential for harm to the
mother due to this law was not acknowledged. The Egyptian legislation refused to
consider any school of law other than Hanafi.120
Article 6, of Law No. 25 of 1929, addressing maltreatment as grounds for divorce,
decreed that a wife bears the burden of proof. However, the wife must establish proof
of the harm, whether by submitting medical reports, filing a police report, or
obtaining two witnesses in cases of physical harm. These terms, perhaps particularly
obtaining witnesses, can be complicated.121 The wife has the right to petition if the
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qadi denies her claims. She also has the right to be appointed two arbitrators if the
qadi denies her petition a second time. The arbitrator’s task is to investigate the causes
of conflict and submit recommendations for conciliation to the court, according to
article 8. If all reconciliation attempts fail, the qadi is instructed to grant her an
irrevocable divorce.122
The reforms of Law No. 25 of 1920 and 1929 did not address all issues in need of
reform. However, the reforms sought to improve the status of women significantly.
The second phase of the reform as well sought to expand women’s divorce rights.123
The process in which these reforms took place was also noteworthy as they were
drawn from the liberal tenets of the Maliki School’s divorce law.124 The tafliq
(selection) doctrine was used to select principles from the Maliki school and depart
from the Hanafi school as a means of reform.125 The reform came to preclude abuses
against women that occurred in the Muslim community. It aimed to prevent false
marriage claims; control and prevent child marriages; restrict men’s unilateral right to
divorce; and counter the abuses of women’s rights to repudiation. The law stipulated
that registrars of marriage are forbidden to register any marriage in which the bride
and groom had not reached the age of sixteen and eighteen.126 The provisions of Law
No.25 of 1929 also stretched the husband’s unilateral repudiation of his wife to deem
the repudiation ineffective in case the husband did not intend to end the marriage.127
The law of 1929 still provides the basic guidelines of family law in Egypt. A later
development of this law established grounds to enable women to obtain a judicial
divorce.
The historical changes in the Egyptian personal status law reflect the sociological
changes throughout time. Two features characterize personal status law in Egypt:
First, the broad conception encompassing questions of marriage, divorce, and
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paternity. Second, the principle of the religious personality of law that exclusively
organizes this branch of law. The principle of the religious personality of laws is a
principle in which each religious community has a specific personal status law that
applies depending on the acknowledged affiliation of the individuals involved. As
mentioned before, the rules of personal status law have never been codified in a
comprehensive code. In 1875, Qadri Pasha, an Egyptian Jurist, attempted to compile
Hanafi Law provisions.128 Even though this work was never promulgated, his
codification remains a significant source of inspiration for judges working on personal
status law cases.129 Codification of laws became dominant in Egyptian legal culture in
the late nineteenth century. Qadri Pasha’s codification of the Hanafi school of law
was significant as it formulated a brief and accessible account of the doctrine.130
During the first half of the twentieth century in Egypt, various statutory laws were
adopted, including Law No. 25 of 1920, which concerned the maintenance and other
questions of personal status.131 It was followed by No. 25 of 1925, which gave women
the right to file for divorce on different grounds, in addition to Law No. 77 of 1943
concerned with inheritance and Law No. 71 of 1946, concerned with testamentary
bequests.132
These reforms took place but were of secondary importance to the declaration of the
Arab Republic of Egypt in 1952, so they were interrupted. The issue of personal
status law then resurfaced in the seventies. Despite numerous proposals and
discussions of legal drafts, no new personal status law was adopted until 1979. Before
1979, a series of personal status laws were in force. These included Law No. 25 of
1920, concerned with maintenance and other questions of personal status; Law No. 56
of 1923, concerned with sharia courts regulations and the legal age or marriage; Law
No. 25 of 1929, concerned with women’s divorce rights; Law No. 78 of 1931,
concerned with Sharia Courts organization; Law No. 77 of 1943 concerned with
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inheritance; Law No 71 of 1946 concerned with testamentary bequests; and Law No.
68 of 1947 and its amendments such as Law No. 629 of 1955 and Law No. 103 of
1976. Further personal status laws in force at the time included Act No. 131 of 1952,
concerned with guardianship; Law No. 119 of 1952 concerned with property
guardianship; Law No. 462 of 1955 transferring court cases that were promulgated by
Sharia and communitarian courts to national courts; and Law No. 62 of 1976
concerning provisions to alimonies.133
In 1979, while the Assembly was in recess, President Sadat issued a decree complying
with Article 147 of the constitution. The Parliament approved the decree-law, which
became Law No. 44 1979.134 The new law amended the previous law to include many
demands made over the century by Egyptian feminists.135 The new law gave women
the right to divorce if their husbands married without notifying them. The Supreme
Constitutional Court then declared the new law unconstitutional in May 1985, as
many judges challenged its conformity with the constitution. It was struck down on
procedural grounds. The Supreme Constitutional Court considered the president’s
powers instead of examining the law from an Islamic law angle. Because the
president issued the law while the Assembly was in recess to ensure its approval, the
court decided the process via which the law was made was unconstitutional. 136 Two
months later, the people’s assembly passed the first legislation enacted by an Egyptian
assembly on personal status law. The new legislation was almost identical to law No.
44 of 1979 and remains the main legislation shaping women’s rights in the family law
context. 137 It gave women the right to divorce their husbands if they were to take
another wife without notifying them.138
Later, Article 11 of Law No. 25 of 1920 was amended by Law No. 100 of 1985. The
amendment required that a marriage contract must indicate whether the husband was
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already married. If he were, the contract must include the name and address of his
prior wife or wives.139 It also stipulated that the notary must notify the first wife of his
new marriage. The husband is also required to provide maintenance for his wife
during their marriage, including her personal resources, regardless of her religion. He
must provide her with all necessary expenses as required by law. If he fails to do so, a
court order shall execute the maintenance on his property. The maintenance provided
by the husband is established based on his wealth.140
Law No. 100 of 1985 stipulates that the mother has custody of her children until her
children reach a certain age. The age at which custody transfers to the father is ten for
boys and twelve for girls. A judge can also extend custody until a boy reaches 15 and
a girl marries. However, in this case, custody would be extended without continuation
of compensation from the father.141 The law also stipulates that a mother has the right
to stay in her matrimonial domicile as long as she maintains custody of her children or
until she remarries.142 The husband cannot stay in the matrimonial domicile unless he
offers other suitable, independent housing. If the house is not rented, the husband can
live in it independently if he provides an alternative. The husband is also required by
law to pay his minor children’s maintenance. A son is owed maintenance until 15
unless he is disabled and deemed incapable of earning. Daughters are due
maintenance payments until they marry or are able to earn an income.143
1. Egyptian Personal Stats Laws Governing Polygamy
Egyptian personal status law permits polygamy. It was neither regulated nor restricted
in the Personal Status Law of 1929. In 1985, an amendment was made stipulating the
husband’s obligation to declare his marital status in the marriage contract.144 The
amendment stated that the husband must state the name of his wife or wives and that
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his wives should be informed of the new marriage by an officially registered letter.145
It is worth noting that as mentioned before, the texts of the Quran actually prohibits
polygamy when reinterpreted.146
After being informed of their husband’s new marriage, a wife or wives then have the
right to ask for a divorce if the new marriage would cause them any moral or financial
harm (darar). A wife has the right to demand a divorce for a year after being
officially informed of the husband’s new marriage. However, practically, it is difficult
to prove harm, especially moral harm, in these cases, since emotional harm is difficult
to prove.147 Law No. 25 of 1929 aims to offer the first wife remedy if her husband’s
remarriage harmed her. Therefore, the legislature allowed women to file for divorce
on various grounds, including divorce for absence of financial maintenance, desertion,
or a significant defect such as madness, chronic illness, etc. Nevertheless, these
options remained subjugated to the judge’s discretionary power of assessment.148
A woman must also present two witnesses who can attest to having seen or heard acts
of bad treatment inflicted by the husband to prove harm. These testimonies are subject
to the unconstrained assessment of the judge. Of course, some physical violence can
occur in the bedroom, where there are no external witnesses. The wife could obtain
medical reports and file a police report. In cases where the wife could not obtain
medical reports at the time or failed to file a police report, this abuse would likely not
surface at court as witnesses would not have seen or heard the abuse.149
2. A Woman’s Right to Divorce in Egyptian Personal Status Law
After the reforms of the 1920s and the Khul law of 2000, personal status law provided
women with the right to obtain a judicial divorce on the grounds of harm. The
different grounds by which a woman could get a judicial divorce are listed in the
145 Id.
146 Supra note 21
147 Supra note 1
148 Supra note 160 at 4
149 Edwards, J., & Cornwall, A. (Eds.). (2014). Feminisms, empowerment and
development: Changing womens lives. Zed Books Ltd..

30

Personal Status Law of 1929 and amended by the Law of 1985. An irrevocable
judicial divorce could be obtained on the following grounds of harm or maltreatment:
serious defect of the husband, moral or material harm in case of polygamy, failure of
the husband to pay maintenance, imprisonment for three or more years, and desertion
for more than one year. In some of these cases, conditions apply. For example, when
seeking divorce on the grounds of moral or material harm in the case of polygamy, a
woman must provide witnesses, as described earlier. When a husband is imprisoned
for three or more years, a woman may only seek divorce after one year of the sentence
has passed.
The wife also bears the burden of proof for any of these grounds for divorce.150 The
law does not specify the harm by which a wife can ask for a divorce. The court of
cassation identified causes of the husband’s harm as physical or verbal harm that does
not suit anyone in her position.151 The amount of harm can only be verified with proof
and evaluated by the court. It can differ from one case to another. For example, a
judge in may rule that moderate physical violence is not harmful if local social
customs and norms allow the husband to discipline his wife. This might be the case
among specific rural communities. However, the same type of physical violence
among the upper class may be considered excessive harm.152
Lama Abu Odeh writes in her work that it is considered normal for a working-class
woman to be beaten by her husband. She writes that it is also typical for men of the
working class to be polygamous. She mentions that if a working-class woman were to
go to court because she is beaten or her husband had taken another wife, she would be
told that “this does not constitute harm the likes of her cannot tolerate and is denied
divorce.” 153 Regardless of these felt discrepancies, the Egyptian Court of Cassation
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defined harm as “inflicting verbal or physical injury on the woman in a way that does
not befit people of her social status.”154
The law also dictates that if a wife leaves her matrimonial house without her
husband’s consent, she is considered nashiz or disobedient.155 A wife is
labelled nashiz when she is not submissive or obedient. In Islam, obedience is
considered a husband’s right. He should have the power to demand things of his wife,
meaning that “she should transfer herself to his domicile, live with him, and that they
should live in harmony.”156 However, in practice, a wife is considered nashiz if she
leaves the husband’s house without a justifiable reason. If a wife does this, she is no
longer entitled to maintenance. This applies regardless of the woman’s reason for
leaving home. For example, she could be deprived of maintenance if she decides to
leave the house if her husband beats or harms her.157 A wife must complain to the
judge and prove harm to secure her divorce rights.
Article 11 of the amendment of 1985 entails that if the woman refuses to obey her
husband, she will be deprived of her maintenance. Maintenance payments cease
effective whenever she leaves the marital house. This date is confirmed after her
husband requests her return via a formal warning delivered by a police officer or
someone the wife has delegated.158 The law allows the husband to file an obedience
case against the wife. The obedience case can be mentioned in the divorce case for the
judge to investigate, affecting his verdict. Researcher Amina Chemais studied the
obstacles facing women who seek divorce in Egypt and found this process
problematic. Chemais’ work revealed that husbands send formal warnings of
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disobedience with bad intentions: to make it more difficult for the wife to obtain a
divorce or avoid paying maintenance.159
In cases where the wife successfully obtains a divorce, she is still faced with several
challenges to obtain her right to maintenance. One of the biggest challenges in such
cases is substantiating a husband’s income. In order to rule in a maintenance case, the
court must decide the amount of spousal or child maintenance based on the husband’s
earning capabilities.160 Thus, the court orders an investigation. However, such
investigations are often informal, unsystematic, and abused by the defendant.161
Whether the defendant works in a formal or informal sector, the employers usually do
not provide accurate information to the court. Employers do so to show support to
their employees or because the husband bribes his informal sector employer to
conceal his actual income and assets from the court.162 Examining such challenges
highlights the difficulty and atrocious measures women go through to gain their
rights. This is not in accord with Sharia. Neither the Quran, nor Sunnah dictate such
rules and rigid procedures for women settle disputes concerning family law.
Likewise, there is no basis for bayt al-ta’a in the Quran or Sunna. On the contrary, the
concept opposes many Quranic stipulations. It opposes stipulations that men and
women have similar rights and that men should not take undue advantage of their
wives or injure them.163 Lawmakers were selective in their approach to divorce in
family law. The laws favor men since the laws were created by traditionalists and
fundamentalists, which is why feminist activists fought hard for reforms.164 For
example, legislators rejected talaq thalath. Talaq thalath is the husband’s
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pronunciation of the three formulae (“I divorce you, I divorce you, I divorce you”) at
one time, after which the divorce takes effect after the woman fulfills her iddah. It
was rejected because Islamic jurisprudence schools of thought recognized tallaq
thalath as invalid. The schools rejected the concept behind the Islamic divorce
procedure. The Islamic procedure dictates that spouses can repudiate the marriage up
to three times until it becomes irrevocable and absolute, creating a bar to remarriage
between them.165 The Egyptian legislature considered a triple repudiation made a onetime equivalent to a single revocable repudiation since 1929.166 Their rejection of
Talaq Thalath is to keep in line with Islamic jurisprudence.
On the other hand, legislators did not dismiss Bayt Al Ta’a’s concept. Instead, they
chose to include it in the law based on Islamic Jurisprudence. Therefore, it can be
argued that the same logic used to dismiss the notion of Talaq Thalath and can be
used to dismiss Bayt Al Ta’a. Given that, Bayt Al Ta’a is humiliating and
incompatible with women’s status today as partners in marital life, employees, and
educated citizens. While Bayt Al Ta’a might have functioned somehow when women
were expected to be only housewives and adhere to society’s traditional gender roles,
it is no longer applicable today.167 There have been shifts in family structure and
society, which demand shifts in personal status law. Women today have expanded
their roles to be one of or sometimes the only economic provider for the family. Thus,
women cannot be expected to be labeled nashiz and return to their matrimonial house
if they leave for work or can no longer endure harm from their husbands, who take
advantage of their wives’ economic or social needs.
Even though the Personal Status Law amendment of 1985 set guidelines for divorce
in Egypt, it failed to respond to developments in Egyptian society or tackle many
family problems. Family courts are overloaded by divorce cases, many of which take
over ten years to settle due to the obstacles to proving harm.168 Despite the mention of
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similar principles in the Quran and Sunna, the Khul’ Law of 2000 was treated like an
innovation in the press and Egyptian parliament. The Quran states: “Give the women
whom you marry their (mahr) with a good heart, but if they, of their own good
pleasure, remit any part of it to you, take it and enjoy it without fear of any harm (as
Allah had made it lawful).”169
While there is no explicit mention of the word “khul,” the Quran refers to a
ransoming procedure. There is also precedent for Khul, established during the
Prophet’s time, authorized by him as stated in Hadiths and Sunnah. The precedent
comes from the case of Thabit bin Shammas and his wife Habiba bent Sahl. The wife
came and said: “O Messenger of God, I do not hate Thabit neither because of his faith
nor his nature, except that I fear unbelief (not to be able to abide by the limits of
Islam).” Prophet Mummamed, Peace be upon him, said, “Will you give back his
orchard?” She said “Yes,” and she gave it back to him and he (the Prophet) said to
Thabit “O Thabit! Accept your garden and divorce her at once.”170
The Khul’ Law No 1 of 2000 was promulgated to facilitate and speed up repudiation
cases and personal status law cases to fix the issue of the court backlog.171 The law
gives the wife the authority to unilaterally divorce the husband if she pays back the
dowry registered in the marriage contract, and forfeits all her financial rights.172
While she undergoes a reconciliation period for three months, if reconciliation fails,
she can irrevocably divorce her husband without the need prove any harm.173 The law
was a subject of controversial debate among the press and in Parliament. Thirty-four
of fifty-two parliament members approved the law, eight of whom were women.174
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B. Changes in the Basis of Personal Status Law
To conclude, the basis of personal status law in Islamic countries needs to be
significantly changed. The immutability of Sharia as a body of principles binding
Muslims is not supported by historical Muslim practice. Further, throughout history,
Sharia has not had exclusive jurisdiction. Instead, the state has always exercised some
level of secular jurisdiction. Even in the areas where Sharia has historically been
applied, it has never been free from state supervision.
Moreover, the institutionalization of Muslims’ ability to seek and act upon
independent fatwa does not exhaust the possibilities of independent legal advice. This
can be done voluntarily without control from the state. Seeking fatwas has always
been a valuable source for believers to address their personal religious needs, even
matters concerning legal advice or opinion. Finally, social developments and legal
reforms that made fiqh more accessible also exposed political and moral issues within
the interpretation of Sharia. These changes exposed selective enforcement of some of
the norms of jurists’ and scholars’ interpretation of Sharia texts over others.
The main question is whether personal status law can remain governed by Sharia
when all other aspects of the legal system are governed by secular law. This question
begs a further discussion. It can be discussed further by examining the following
questions: Why has personal status law continued to be governed by Sharia, and how
can this arrangement be justified? As such, is personal status law divine?
Alternatively, is it governed by human opinion, expressed through jurists and authors?
Are the opinions of these jurists and authors an expression of divine will? What might
be a better approach to the current situation that would create a fairer situation for
Muslim women without compromising the religious identity of Muslim societies and
Islamic devotion?
As mentioned before, all aspects of the legal system of most Muslim countries are
currently governed by secular state law except for personal status law. Personal status
law is governed by Sharia jurisdiction. One of the main reasons for this has been that
family law has been traditionally the most developed area of Sharia, in which jurists
had the highest power. One of the arguments supporting this has been that Quran and
Sunna govern matters related to family law in more explicit detail than other matters.
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Matters related to commercial, criminal, and land law, for example, are not governed
strictly by Sharia. For this reason, some argue that it is more practical and possible to
introduce reforms in other areas of law.
Additionally, Muslim countries’ governments somehow deployed the western
distinction between the private and the public domain. Because personal status law is
deemed a private matter, it made more sense to be left as a matter of religion that is
politically less significant. For this reason, it also made sense to leave it in the hands
of the ulama. Therefore, governments followed the practice of colonial powers. They
reduced the jurisdiction of Sharia, removing it from most aspects of the legal system
like the economy and public law. However, they excluded personal status law from
this secularization process since it was politically insignificant.175
Nevertheless, these arguments raise more questions than they answer. The success of
any government reforms of the pre-existing legal system relied on several factors,
such as the balance of powers between modernist and conservative groups that
continue shifting today. So far, governments prefer opting for more control over
personal status law to satisfy conservatives. The question of why conservative forces
would settle for personal status law and not aim for commercial and criminal law
remains. Why not aim for total control over all institutions and state law? One claim
is that because Sharia principles and doctrines are fluid, they cannot be enforced
within a unified legal system. The framework of such a legal system is too rigid.
As a model for moral order established and developed from a premise in legal
discipline, instead of actual practical human experience, Sharia challenges
confinement to clearly defined or established legal principles of general application.
The development of Sharia was a “phenomenon of legal science, not the state playing
legislator.” 176 The provisions of Sharia have historically been flexible and openended. Variations in Sharia-derived law have arisen from individual moral choices.
Impersonal institutions like today’s courts cannot assess them. In other words, Sharia
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no longer functions as its initial desired body of principles by acting as a positive law
of the state.
The irony is that by failing to face the modernizing elite of the state, Muslim countries
choose to sacrifice the fundamental human rights of women for political expediency.
These elite are the real problem. They have made personal status law the last upholder
of religious principles and abandoned the administration of real justice by confining
family law to the control of Muslim jurists. The secularization of all fields of the legal
system has rendered the religious tone of personal status law the only remaining
aspect of Sharia law. Ironically, this was strongly influenced by the lack of opposition
to the sudden abandonment of Sharia in all other fields of law as personal status
became the only disputed issue. Therefore, the debate over personal status law is a
sensitive issue in the Muslim community and a significant struggle between
modernists and traditionalists in the Muslim world.
There are two central sides to this debate. Sharia is completely directed within an
Islamic framework, in which state enforcement is taken for granted. Besides, because
the debate between modernists and traditionalists obtained a sharp political edge,
sometimes personal status reforms had to be revoked to avoid a religious backlash
against governments.177 Therefore, the debate shifts according to the underlying
tensions between different sides of the time. At the top of the debate is the fluctuating
balance of power between state and religion, influenced by various factors such as the
failure of leaders to deliver their promises of political development and
independence.
The political manipulation of religious legitimacy has been a common theme for
centuries. However, what is new are the gender relations that have grown to be an
integral part of this society and its politics. The changing position of women in
Muslim societies is new.178 Modernists had the upper hand to change gender relations
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during the early twentieth century. They aimed to enhance women’s autonomy and
equality. However, fundamentalists took over the political platform by the end of the
century. They chose to reverse any advances towards gender equality. The central
question of women’s emancipation remained an issue throughout the century.
Fundamentalists considered the abandonment of Sharia in personal status law as the
final defeat of a patriarchal Islamic order. Meanwhile, modernists considered this
abandonment a necessary step towards creating a more progressive society. The
fundamental misconception of expressing the issues in these terms is associating
family law with historical interpretations of Sharia, let alone with Islam as a religion.
At first glance, family law may appear to be derived from Sharia in most Muslim
countries. However, when examining the application of personal status law, one finds
that it has little to do with Sharia's lenient and flexible fundamental nature. Its
application is contrary to the intention of Sharia's founding jurists. The foundation of
the debate is flawed. The topic is sure to remain contentious, too, until it addresses
more valid questions that have been overlooked or intentionally suppressed in the
past. The question remains: To what extent does personal status law relate to the life
of Muslims today? If it does relate at all, through what processes is it translated into
the reality of Muslims’ society? 179 Today, Sharia-derived personal status law is
touted as the sole body of principles upholding the Islamic identity of social relations.
However, the reality of how Sharia-based personal status law operates is unclear, as it
is difficult to go through the case laws occurring in courts every day.
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V.

A Suggested Process Towards Changing Personal Status Laws in Egypt
Personal status laws in Egypt, specifically ones regarding women’s rights,

have historically been the most immutable parts of the law. Twentieth century
modernizers have often used it as a “sacrificial lamb” or a bargaining chip in order to
successfully impose secular codes in the areas of civil, criminal and commercial
issues.180 There’s a plethora of changes that could be made to personal status laws that
would create massive change for women. Unfortunately, it’s often not as simple as,
for example, suggesting a bill abolishing polygamy in Egypt claiming a revised
interpretation of Islamic teachings. The resistance likely to be met by the parliament,
the general public and law enforcers will either keep the bill from being passed, have
it appealed and removed or rarely implemented. It would also make aggressive
retaliation with more regressive laws and social norms a lot more likely.
A good example of conservative retaliation is what followed the American
civil war in 1865— the war that managed to abolish slavery in the US. Despite its
success, for the decades following came a slew of both legal and social retaliations,
such as the enactment of Jim Crow laws designed specifically to disenfranchise Black
Americans and legalize their segregation. Over 400 statues of slave owners were also
erected all throughout the country as a symbol of American pride, many of which are
still up today.181 Without proper strategy, Egypt could face similar repercussions for
minimal progress. Therefore, in order to minimize resistance in a country that’s
already majorly charged in the conservative direction, one must take a more careful
and holistic view of the sociocultural mechanism that helps create, amend or abolish
laws in a more permanent manner when it comes to personal status laws.
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A. The Sociocultural Mechanism Behind Policy Making
The human ability to self-govern and run a society through collectively chosen laws is
quite the phenomenon. Historically speaking, human beings in the context of a
lawless society were relatively primitive, impulsive and difficult to control. The way
human beings developed even the most primitive forms of a legal system was by
recognizing and channeling incentives.182 For example, in a society where theft has
never been battled, it could feel impossible to set a law that prohibits it. If anyone
could take what isn’t theirs whenever they need it, and there is no real promise of
properly preventing theft in general, many members in that society would be perfectly
happy with theft as long as they were the strongest and most protected, and the rest
would’ve likely taken all necessary measures to prevent theft of their property— thus
the normalization of the crime. Without proper foresight as to how much better
society would be without theft, everyone lacks the incentive to properly put that law
in place.

B. The Gap Between Egyptian Law and Accepted Practice (The De Jure De
Facto Gap)
Another obstacle to note specifically when speaking of Egyptian law is how
disconnected society is from its legal system; the de jure/de facto gap. Egypt has
suffered from decades of authoritarian rule and corruption, and one of the
consequences of the citizens’ disconnection from the legal system.183 This generally
means that a significant portion of a nation has lost faith in the legal system to grant
them real justice with truly important matters. Egypt has long been seen as a country
mainly driven by cultural norms rather than by its own legal system. This further
complicates the process of creating any real change for women through the law, since
the guarantee of its implementation becomes less of a guarantee.

182

Bodley J. (2012), Anthropology and Contemporary Human Problem.

183

Gloppen S. (2014) Courts, Corruption and Judicial Independence.

41

Because of this disconnect, there are currently plenty of social norms and traditions
that are discriminatory or violent against women that remain common despite having
harsh legal penalties. According to a survey by UNICEF, an estimated 87.2% of
Egyptian women between the ages of 15-49 have undergone female genital mutilation
(FGM)184, despite it being illegal and punishable by up to 20 years in prison185. UN
Women has also reported that over 99.3% of Egyptian girls and women have
experienced sexual harassment in their lifetime despite its illegality and despite its
drastic increases in punishment over the years, including the most recent amendment
officially rendering it a felony with a minimum of 5 years in prison or a penalty of up
to 300,000 EGP.186
This means that the cultural forces pushing for such normalized violence against
women are much stronger than the legal system at the moment, and therefore should
be studied more carefully in order to increase citizen engagement with the law, and to
implement the right laws to tackle the problem more effectively.

C. A Feminist Interpretation of the Qur’an and Hadith
Many people from around the world, academics, and laymen alike, look to
religion, namely Islam and wonder whether it is, in its essence, antithetical to
women’s rights by modern standards. I argue that this perception is largely due to the
fundamentalist view of Islam that has remained dominant and unconfronted for
decades, therefore becoming the main shaper of laws and social norms across Muslim
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countries, including Egypt. Before we jump into suggested amendments and
implementation strategies for personal status laws, we will first lay out some more
progressive feminist interpretations of the Qur’an and Hadith.
As with every set of laws that human beings decide to collectively abide by—
Islamic teachings, including Qur’an and Hadith, are segmented into central, relatively
immutable laws and philosophies, followed by peripheral laws designed to either
complement or help implement those main laws. Muslim reformists suggest that the
reason behind many of the regressive laws in Muslim countries, specifically those that
discriminate against women, are likely the result of falsely centralizing teachings that
were meant to be peripheral and vice versa. This tends to change the entire meaning
of the text and the conclusions people walk away with.187 For example, some of the
most commonly recalled aspects of Islam, both by Muslims and non-Muslims is its
list of controversial prohibitions such as pre-marital sex, gambling, the consumption
of alcohol, pork, carrion and blood, the meat of carnivorous animals, or meat that isn’t
prepared according to Islamic laws.188
Mainly as a result of the fact that these are the most heavily socially enforced
laws, above all else, many Muslims make the mistake of centralizing these
prohibitions, while ignoring other more commonly mentioned messages of the text.
By doing so, the prohibitions seem immutable, random and arbitrary, therefore
leaving room for assumptions as to the values behind such prohibitions. A common
take-away message is the “blind obedience and the repression of all your desires,” a
central philosophy for many Islamic fundamentalists. However, many Muslims
recognize the Qur’an’s central message to be that God is a loving creator that wants
the best for all His creations, and that there is one path or ‘al siraat al mostaqeem’
which when followed, brings blessings, and when strayed from, chaos ensues— from
the most famous and commonly recited verse in the Qur’an ‘alfatha’. When putting
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these prohibitions in context of this central message, one can deduce that the values
motivating these prohibitions are ones like family preservation, ensuring a life free of
addiction, animal abuse, disease, etc., rather than just blind obedience to arbitrary
laws.
D. The Revolutionary and Pro-rebellion Interpretation of Islam
Muslim religious scholar, Reza Aslan, also points out the often-forgotten fact that all
religions, including Islam, commonly centralize the concept of revolution against
stubborn unjust systems for the sake of a more just world. Aslan claims that all
Abrahamic religions revolve around the concept that God is He who transcends all
systems of power, and that all his messengers sought to reverse the social order
against all odds. “When the sky cracks, and the stars fall, scattering, and when the
seas burst forth, and when the graves are turned inside out, a soul will know what it
put forth and left behind.” Quran (82:1-5) Ironically, Aslan argues, this interpretation
of Islamic teachings argues for an awakened conscience rather than the blind loyalty
to older systems. This therefore negates the conservative desire to glorify the status
quo rather than consistently re-evaluate it in good faith.

E. Reinterpreting Women’s Roles in Society in Qur’an and Hadith
Bringing this back to Quranic verses that pertain to women’s rights and roles in
society, many Muslim feminist reformists, including Asma Barlas, argue that these
phrases (which happen to be representative of less than 0.01 percent of the text) are
often cherry-picked, interpreted from a patriarchal lens, and falsely centralized above
all other verses and sayings in the Qur’an and Hadith, respectively189, including
verses that directly contradict such interpretations. Many Muslim feminists aim to recentralize Islamic teachings back to the concept of a genderless, loving and allknowing God, so as to naturally encourage the public to revisit laws, and social norms
that seem to oppose this central message, namely the unequal treatment of women.190
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Many Egyptian feminists that had made waves over the past year, including Malak
Boghdady, point out the hypocrisy and selective piousness of Egyptian society when
it comes to enforcing Islamic teachings: ‘How come we’re only an Islamic country
when we’re talking about limiting the freedoms of women? Corruption, sexual
harassment, honor killings, denial of inheritance rights, all strictly prohibited in Islam,
yet fly under the radar, but women’s freedoms is what raises a red flag?’ This
rightfully points to the fact that the persistence to keep personal status laws that
specifically denigrate women are often not a sign of allegiance to Sharia Law nor
Islam in general, but a society that has grown accustomed to the benefits of a system
that consistently favors men over women. Otherwise, the deviation from Islamic
instructions would be a point of criticism across all matters, not just with regards to
women’s behavior. Thus, I suggest a holistic strategy in order to reform personal
status laws to produce more equality for women.
As stated earlier, implementing laws that promote equality among women is
more than just about passing bills. One of the main obstacles standing in the way of
true personal status law reform of Egypt’s personal status laws is our sociocultural
norms. Without proper consideration of such norms surrounding any particular issue,
the passing of new laws will be futile— either because traditionalists and
conservatives will immediately appeal the law, or because of resistance in its
implementation, which would in turn reduce public trust in the legal system.
However, with enough effective structural changes in our laws in a way that
substantially and positively affects women’s position in society, we could begin to
soften the sociocultural norms that stand in the way of true change.191
In other words, the more effectively we introduce and implement laws that
help remove layers of oppression off Egyptian women— or abolish obsolete, outdated
ones— the easier it becomes to implement more laws that may have once been an
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impossibility. In this chapter, my policy-making strategy won’t just be focused on
drafting adequate amendments to personal status laws, but on ways that could help
minimize resistance and ensure their implementation in a more consistent manner. My
strategy will also be aiming to increase citizen engagement, mobilize women’s groups
in an attempt to amplify Egyptian women’s voices.

F.Suggested Amendments to Personal Status Law
Most personal status laws that are in major need of reform when it comes to women’s
rights, are due to the fact that they have been taken out of sociocultural context and
applied at a time when social dynamics between men and women are radically
different.

1. A Woman’s Right to Divorce in Egyptian Personal Status Law
There seems to be mixed opinions among Egyptian feminists with the regards
to the proper amendments required to our marriage and divorce laws. This is mainly
due to a difference in feminist philosophy when it comes to the roles of men and
women in society. 192 There seems to be a general consensus that divorce laws should
be made more equal among men and women, so that women are not burdened with
extra requirements and sacrifices in order to instigate the divorce themselves.
However, opinions seem to diverge when it comes to the financial aspects of Khul’
and divorce.
Cultural feminists and post-modern feminists place a high priority on considering the
cultural conditions of women in Egypt while implementing or amending laws.
Cultural feminists recognize a distinctive “women’s voice” that needs to be amplified
in order to achieve true equality. Cultural feminists often accept domesticated gender
roles for women in the name of cultural relativism, and also accept traditions such as
the husband being the main financial provider of the household, regardless of the
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wife’s personal wealth or employment status. Some cultural feminists stand on the
side of creating fully equal divorce laws for men and women. On the other hand,
secular and radical feminists argue that financial obligations from husband to wife is
an anti-feminist idea based on the notion that a woman cannot provide for herself, and
is therefore antithetical to the concept of equality.
Secondly, the financial aspect of marriage is a largely contextual matter and should
therefore be reflected as such in the law. Many reformists argue that the necessity for
maintenance to be paid was set during a time when women were relatively
biologically confined, due to increased chances of birthing children prior to the
invention of contraceptives. Women therefore lacked the capacity to be as active as
men. Consequently, the natural arrangement for the majority of cases was the
domestication of women while men paid maintenance so as to support their
household. 193
However, it is an undeniable fact that the conditions for women have drastically
changed, and therefore the conversation about revising the husband’s obligation to
maintenance is long overdue. The husband’s obligation to pay maintenance should be
placed under the condition that the woman is either unemployed, employed at a
relatively low-paying job, or should it be mandated and agreed to by both parties in
the marriage contract. In the case of divorce, all conditions of maintenance payment
by the divorced husband remain if maintenance was within the marriage agreement to
begin with.
This grants Egyptian women the ability to opt into this arrangement should it fit their
personal worldview about marriage, while also granting women the right to remain on
equal financial standing as their husbands as well. Since the system currently in place
to evaluate the husband’s income in order to calculate the owed maintenance is
informal, unreliable and often abused, I suggest the penalty for forgery and perjury be
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legally raised, particularly if the woman has proven to be impoverished or in dire
financial circumstances.

2. Women’s Custody Rights To Children
The same argument could be made about context when it comes to the laws on the
topic of custody of children. Secular and radical feminists often argue that the global
inclination to favor mothers over fathers when it comes to child custody falls under
the category of benevolent discrimination, namely that women are naturally more
nurturing than men and therefore are usually assumed to be more suitable for custody
than the father.194 In light of that, I suggest that custody laws require a thorough
investigation regarding the financial and emotional fitness of both parents for custody
as opposed to assuming fitness based on gender. Custody of children should also not
be depended on the gender of the child, but their needs instead.
Some cultural feminists may argue that distinct essentialist natures exist between men
and women, generally rendering women more “nurturing” than men. However, I
argue that this amendment does not contradict this claim. Should women generally be
the more fit custodian of the child, the investigations carried out will surely reflect it.
This is in order to protect the cases where this is not necessarily the case and to
remove some of the social pressure off women to be nurturing beings all the time.

3. Obedience In Marriage
With regards to wife’s obedience to her husband, this one also appears to be from
cherry-picked verses in the Qur’an while leaving out verses that emphasize equal
value and mutual respect required between husband and wife. For example, ‘they
(women) are a garment for you (men) and you are a garment for them.’ These laws
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were also suggested at a time with radically different social norms among men and
women, where women were heavily segregated from men and assigned entirely
different roles in society. Since men were the breadwinners, the ones who worked in
the fields, while women were mostly at home, it makes relatively more sense at the
time that obeying the husband helped maintain a relatively safer household dynamic.
Hadith Bukhari states: “A man is expected to be the guardian of [his] family, whereas
a woman is expected to be the guardian of their home and children.” In light of that, it
would make sense in that context that ‘leaving the home’ could result in no
maintenance— since that was the typical marital arrangement of their time. However,
I argue that many of the definitions accepted by Egyptian law as “disobedience”
require serious revision. Prophet Muhammad had also said: ‘There is no obedience in
evil deeds. Obedience is only required in what is good.’ (Hadith 12) The current
connotation for the word “obedience,” particularly in the context of modern Egyptian
culture, means obedience of whatever is asked, including things you perceive as
harmful. In light of that, I suggest that obedience, as a legal reason behind depriving
women of her rightful maintenance should be abolished.

4. Egyptian Personal Stats Laws Governing Polygamy
As stated earlier, the Qur’an, once the verse is read fully, actually prohibits polygamy.
The number of men in polygamous marriages in Egypt is also just less than 1%,
making it a relatively unpopular choice among Egyptians. There have already been
some controversies spurred in attempt to shed light on the prohibition of polygamy in
Islam. In 2019, Ahmed al-Tayeb, the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar publicly stated that
polygamy is forbidden in Islam and ‘an injustice to women’.195
“In 90 per cent of cases – and I am not exaggerating – polygamy involves
injustice toward the wife, her family and her children,” said Sheikh al-Azhar
Ahmed al-Tayeb. “Polygamy is an example of a distorted understanding of the
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Koran and the Sunnah [traditions] of the Prophet . . . polygamy is a right that
is restricted by conditions, such as the condition of fairness. If there is no
fairness, polygamy becomes haram [prohibited]. This issue is not open for
experiments.”
Although he didn’t call for the legal prohibition, this suggests that there may be more
of a consensus on its baselessness in Islamic texts, and that there could therefore be
room for its prohibition to be successful in the near future. Al-Tayeb did receive a
backlash for his comment, particularly from Al-Nour member Sameh Abdel Hamid
Hamouda, who recommended polygamy ‘if you can afford it’ as it ‘would give many
unmarried women the chance to have a family and children.’ The Al-Nour party is
well known for its roots in 18th-century Saudi Wahhabism, one of the most extremist
sects of Islam.196

G.Implementation Strategies of Personal Status Law Amendments
1- The Indirect Approach
Many of personal status laws are bulky and convoluted, and boldly reversing or
adding a controversially progressive law comes with its risks. Therefore, I suggest
that indirect approaches also be taken just in case it minimizes the potential for
resistance. For example, abolishing polygamy could be a risky move that could
warrant heavy retaliation from conservatives. Therefore, we could also implement
laws to ensure husbands are left with very little room to abuse it—which may end up
completely deterring some men from the idea of polygamy.

Another example would be to bargain with certain laws in order to obtain or abolish
others. For example, by implementing laws that grant a better chance of custody to
the father, should he be seen as the more fit parent, this could then leave room in the

196

Id.

50

general public to discuss the possibility of equalizing divorce laws. Another indirect
approach would be to soothe some of the sociocultural resistance against feminist
reform. One of the main reasons behind the resistance faced from the public regarding
women’s rights reform is the perception that it’s Western Influence in a Trojan horse
attempting to erase Egyptian culture. Therefore, by implementing laws in the field of
cinema that demand a certain limit to Western representation of feminism, as opposed
to Egyptian forms of feminism, this may eventually reverse the impression in people’s
minds necessarily linking women’s rights movements with Western intervention.
An example of implementing law in cinema that ended up majorly affecting cultural
norms, particularly with regards to women’s rights is Egypt’s ‘Clean Cinema’ laws
that were implemented in the 1990s. These laws prohibited intimate scenes between
men and women on screen but seemed to leave in scenes where men show aggressive
sexual behavior towards women, while women remain docile. Many activists argue
that these laws are a major driver for the sexual harassment and sexual abuse crisis
happening in Egypt right now.197
2- The Direct Approach
The direct approach refers to the bold suggestion of code changes on the basis of a
feminist interpretation of the Qur’an and Hadith. Although preventing retaliation from
the public is important in order to prevent a scenario where women end up with more
damaging laws that diminish their rights, it would also be an important part of a larger
strategy to periodically take the bold and direct approach for a few reasons: It gauges
the public and lets lawmakers know just how far the country has come with regards to
the changes they find acceptable. It’s important not to underestimate the level of
progress in the country when strategizing about reform. It sends a bold and necessary
message to the disenchanted women in the country who may have previously lost
faith that anyone within the legal system is in their corner, or it sends a bold and
necessary warning to all male citizens pursuing criminal behavior against women that
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the matter is being taken more seriously. Also, it emboldens Egyptian feminists,
which could in turn heighten citizen engagement and trust in the system. It could also
possibly help close the disconnect between citizens and their legal system, as it
incrementally encourages more women to use the law to get their justice as opposed
to resorting to social norms. Bold legal moves could be particularly powerful,
especially this year following the women’s rights movement against sexual
harassment.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

The perspective presented in this thesis offers a framework through which personal
status law can be changed. It also clarifies that Sharia-based family law is not divine
nor immutable and should be subject to change. Therefore, the reader can recognize
the link between secular law, Sharia-based family law, customary social practices, the
history and development of Islamic law, the impact of colonialism, and the effect of
political events on all the above. This thesis has highlighted the tensions between the
legacies of cultural norms and the legal practices that led to establishing the current
legal system. It has done so to emphasize that human agency, not Sharia law, plays an
essential role in the development and conception of personal status law. Differences
between the four schools of thought and the various Islamic customary practices
result from human actions and decisions.
The focus of this thesis was to emphasize the cultural and political dimensions that
factored into the development of personal status law in Egypt. Therefore, this thesis
aims to acknowledge that personal status law in Egypt today is not and should not be
considered divine and immutable. Like all aspects of the legal system of Egypt,
family law has been shaped by many factors. The most significant of these factors
have been the development of the legal system, the political will of legislators and
lawmakers, and human interpretations of Sharia. It has not been shaped by the will of
God nor the Prophet’s Sunnah to the extent traditionalists argue.
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